Chinese propaganda directed at audiences in the Global South functions today primarily as a coherent narrative system, rather than a collection of individual messages. Its strength lies not in pushing a single thesis, but in skillfully combining emotions, identity elements, and practical developmental promises into a comprehensive story about the world. In this story, the West—and particularly the United States—is presented as an actor whose relations with weaker states are, by definition, burdened by the logic of dominance. This includes the struggle for resources, political pressure, the instrumentalization of security, and the selective application of international law and norms. The goal of this material is not to summarize individual publications, but to show how a repeatable pattern of influence can be recognized based on them. This pattern consists of the gradual delegitimization of the West, the normalization of the Chinese presence, and the presentation of a narrative about “sovereignty and development” as a shared mission of the Global South.
This implies the existence of a carefully designed message architecture. First, distrust toward the West is built through appeals to moral frameworks such as hypocrisy, lawlessness, or hegemony. Subsequently, psychological mechanisms are activated, including fear of instrumentalization, anger at inequality, and the need for dignity and agency. Only in a later stage does a positive identity proposal appear, based on the idea of “modernity without Westernization,” supplemented by a legitimacy package in the form of dialogue, exchange of experiences, and institutional formats of cooperation. An essential element of this strategy is credibility-building techniques. The message is intended to give the impression of being the voice of the region rather than instructions formulated in Beijing. For this reason, the allegedly “grassroots” dimension of public opinion is highlighted, humor and memes are used as evidence of social awareness, and the voices of experts and practitioners from the Global South are invoked, assigned the role of carriers of local authority.
Prologue: Two Messages, One Influence Operation
In messages addressed to the Global South, Chinese propaganda rarely operates through a “single text.” It is rather a narrative package: one element builds emotion and delegitimizes the competitor (the West), while the other suggests an attractive alternative (China) and closes the conclusion. The recipient does not receive a direct “instruction.” Instead, they are provided with a set of associations, moral frames, and ready-made interpretations intended to be internalized as their own conclusion. In this logic, the West appears as a source of risk, while China appears as a potential opportunity. The text below describes the mechanics of this operation as a conclusion drawn from the observed method of communication, without summarizing source materials.
I. Message Architecture Based on Competitor Delegitimization and Self-Promotion of Its Own Model
The basic blueprint of Chinese propaganda in the Global South is compositionally simple but effective. First, there is a gradual erosion of trust in the West, followed by the presentation of the Chinese model as an alternative solution. In practice, this means that the communication is rarely limited to criticizing the US/EU; criticism is a tool, and the goal is to shift the reference point for development, security, and prestige.
The mechanism works like a funnel. It begins with emotions such as indignation, fear, a sense of grievance, or the shame associated with being the “periphery.” Its result is a rationalized political decision involving distance from the West, greater acceptance of China, and an increasing tolerance for its institutional, economic, and cultural presence. The advantage of this method is that the recipient is left with the impression that they “reached this conclusion themselves.”
II. “The Voice of the People” as a Tool for Persuasion and Credibility-Building
Chinese propaganda is very eager to build credibility through a “grassroots” framework, using social reactions, memes, irony, comments, and emotions present in the public sphere as a starting point. This is an element of high effectiveness in regions where recipients are sensitive to official propaganda and, at the same time, attach importance to the “authentic voice” of society.
This maneuver simultaneously serves three functions:
- It immunizes the message against the charge of propaganda (“it is the people speaking, not the state”);
- It creates social proof (if so many people react this way, it must be true);
- It allows political theses to be smuggled in the packaging of humor, which lowers the recipient’s vigilance.
As a result, a tool typical of internet culture is transformed into a political argument. The key is not whether the joke is true, but the fact that it is appropriated as a diagnosis of the world.
III. The Hegemon Frame: The West Portrayed as a System Instrumentalizing States
One of the strongest narrative axes is the presentation of the West as a hegemon that reduces states to resources and utility. In this frame, international relations are not a partnership but resemble an extractive market where the more “valuable” a country is considered, the greater the perceived threat becomes. This signifies an inversion of liberal intuition, according to which value was supposed to ensure security. In this narrative, value begins to be equated with risk.
This image is strategically tailored to the sensitivities of the Global South, including the memory of colonialism and asymmetric relations, the experience of sanctions and conditional pressure, as well as entrenched distrust toward the intentions of great powers. In this perspective, the West ceases to appear as a “community of values” and begins to function as a mechanism that integrates the weak into a game on the terms of the strong. Even neutral gestures can, in such logic, be interpreted as a manifestation of paternalism or reconnaissance.
IV. Selective Legalism and Moral Shaming: The West “Above the Law,” the South “On the Side of Principles”
Another technique is moralization based on the language of international law and the equality of states. In this view, the West declares an attachment to norms but is portrayed as an actor that does not follow them, speaks of partnership while in practice implementing the logic of dominance, and appeals to the idea of progress while being driven by self-interest. A strong emotion associated with a sense of hypocrisy and injustice is built upon this image.
This is not a neutral “dispute over interpretations.” It is a delegitimization operation in which the West is reduced to the role of a cynical actor, while the Global South is presented as the morally entitled party. Once the recipient accepts this frame, the dispute over facts loses significance, as the West begins to be perceived as an actor that is, by definition, unreliable.
V. The Leverage of Fear: “Being Noticed” as a Threat
The most practical emotion in this construction is fear, understood not in abstract categories but as a politically useful emotion. In this narrative, the source of the threat is not only the aggression of the hegemon but the very visibility of the state. A country that gains importance may be dragged into a conflict of interests, political pressure, destabilization, or the compulsion to choose a side.
This is a mechanism that reinforces caution regarding cooperation with the West, increases the attractiveness of neutralism and so-called “strategic autonomy,” and simultaneously prepares the ground for an alternative partner who promises “respect” and a “lack of imposition.” In psychological terms, this constitutes the foundation for the conclusion that the safest strategy is to avoid the West as a source of risk.
VI. “Modernization Without Westernization”: An Identity Offer as a Political Product
The delegitimization of the West would be incomplete without a positive proposal. Chinese propaganda thus offers an idea: modernization is the right of every country and does not require copying the West. This is not just a developmental postulate. In this view, it is also an identity product. The recipient receives moral permission to be modern on their own terms, without the complex of “civilizational backwardness.”
This idea works on several levels simultaneously. In the psychological dimension, it reinforces a sense of pride and reduces the experience of inferiority. In the political dimension, it provides justification for governance models and public policies different from Western ones. Finally, on the geopolitical level, it legitimizes the choice of China as a partner, presented as an actor “respecting the diversity of developmental paths.” In the background, there is a clear message that the West links modernization with the transformation of values and institutions, while China offers it as a tool for development, not a civilizational project.
VII. The African (and Southern) “Witness” as a Credibility Technique: The Transfer of Authority
In propaganda directed at the Global South, it is crucial not to sound like a voice from the outside. Therefore, China eagerly reinforces its message with quotes and opinions presented as voices from the region, coming from experts, officials, consultants, or academic circles. Their function is not limited to conveying information but consists of the transfer of authority. The thesis is thus intended to take on a local character, even if its architecture was designed outside the region.
Such a maneuver reduces suspicions of propaganda, builds an impression of partnership—understood as dialogue rather than a lecture—and creates social proof among the elites. The recipient should not feel that they are being convinced, but rather that their perspective has been included in the message.
VIII. Normalization of the Chinese Presence: Institutions, Platforms, and Exchanges as Influence Infrastructure
Chinese self-promotion does not end with slogans. Its constant element is the normalization of the “long duration,” in which cooperation is presented as an irreversible process, based on institutions, dialogue formats, exchange programs, training, knowledge networks, and the narrative of “intergenerational friendship.”
This is important because in propaganda, it is not only conviction that matters, but habituation. Once the recipient accepts the Chinese presence as a permanent element of the landscape, the threshold of criticism decreases. Over time, what might have raised concerns (political influence, economic dependencies, asymmetries) is covered by the language of normal developmental cooperation.
IX. “Win-win” as a Semantic Umbrella: Disarming Questions About Costs and Asymmetries
In the Chinese narrative, the keyword is “mutual benefits.” It is used like an umbrella under which contradictory interests are housed. In practice, it is a communication technique that disarms questions about costs (who controls supply chains, who decides on standards, who gains from resources, what are the financial terms, what are the political consequences).
When the discussion is dominated by the “win-win” narrative, criticism begins to be presented as a manifestation of prejudice, an element of Western propaganda, or proof of a lack of understanding of local needs—or even as an obstacle to development. As a result, the field of dispute shifts from specific costs and interests to an assessment of intentions.
X. Final Result: Building an “Anti-Hegemonic Consensus” and Shifting Loyalty
The described mechanisms combine into the final result: creating a conviction among the recipients in the Global South that:
- The West is a risk and a moral contradiction,
- Strategic autonomy requires distance from the West,
- China is a natural partner for modernization “on one’s own terms.”
This does not necessarily lead to full “pro-Chinese” sentiment. It is enough if it weakens pro-Western reflexes, increases tolerance for Chinese projects, raises the political cost of cooperation with the US/EU, and lowers the cost of cooperation with China. In the information environment, this is a very measurable change. It shifts the norm of what is considered reasonable, safe, and profitable.
Conclusions
The conclusions of the analysis are unambiguous: Chinese propaganda in the Global South does not consist solely of “criticizing the West” or “promoting developmental cooperation.” It is a precisely constructed mechanism that first weakens trust in the West as a partner and then redirects developmental aspirations and the need for dignity toward China. In the narrative layer, three interconnected goals are key: (1) establishing the conviction that the West operates in the logic of a hegemon and instrumentalizes weaker states, (2) creating an identity-based “we” of the Global South as a collective that is awakened, wronged, and morally entitled to reject hegemony, (3) presenting China as a real, pragmatic, and “diversity-respecting” partner for modernization.
It is worth emphasizing that the effectiveness of this operation does not stem from the necessity of directly falsifying facts. In many cases, propaganda wins through selection and generalization: it chooses examples so that they fit the thesis of hegemony and then transforms them into a rule describing the entire West. Simultaneously, it reaches for humor, irony, and grassroots reactions of public opinion, which lower the threshold of criticism, and then converts them into a political argument. This gives the recipient the impression that they are not being “convinced,” but are observing a natural, shared conclusion of the societies of the Global South.
The second pillar of effectiveness is the offer of modernization without Westernization. It acts as an identity product and a tool of legitimacy. From the recipients’ perspective, it is a promise: one can develop without copying the West, without losing cultural continuity, and without a sense of subordination. From China’s perspective, it is a mechanism for expanding influence: if modernity is detached from the West, the space for Chinese standards, institutions, cooperation formats, and long-term economic and personnel presence naturally grows. Therefore, elements of normalization, such as dialogue platforms, expert networks, exchange programs, training, and the language of intergenerational cooperation, play such an important role in propaganda. They do not fulfill a decorative function but constitute the infrastructure of influence that shifts the prevailing norm over time. The Chinese presence then ceases to be perceived as a political choice and begins to function as an obvious element of the developmental landscape.
In the final result, it is not about all societies of the Global South becoming unequivocally pro-Chinese. It is enough to achieve intermediate goals, which nevertheless have key strategic importance. These include raising the political cost of cooperation with the West, weakening the pro-Western reflexes of elites and public opinion, building social consent for “strategic autonomy” understood in practice as distance from the US and the European Union, and lowering the threshold of acceptance for Chinese projects and narratives. This shift of the “reference point” is the most valuable result of propaganda: it changes not only opinions on a single event but the frames in which recipients interpret the world.ce for its own standards, institutions, and long-term economic presence.
Author: Tadeusz Kania – Disinfo Digest