The press release issued by Amsterdam & Partners LLP on 8 April 2026, concerning a formal complaint submitted to the European Commission in relation to the planned deployment of the HRRT instrument (Hybrid Rapid Response Team) in Armenia, does not function as a neutral legal communication. From its opening lines, it imposes a specific interpretation on the situation: the activity of the European Union is framed as “interference in the democratic process” and as a factor “undermining free elections.” What matters is that the information about the complaint is immediately embedded in a frame of accusation rather than procedure. This shift determines the function of the entire message. It is not a neutral description of a dispute, nor even a standard procedural position. What we are dealing with is an attempt to change the level at which the conflict is understood. A dispute concerning internal political dynamics in Armenia and the role of external institutional support is recast as a question of legal responsibility and the legitimacy of the European Union’s actions as a whole.
A key element of this operation appears immediately, although it is easy to overlook. The law firm acts as legal counsel for a specific political actor associated with the Strong Armenia project and with Samvel Karapetyan. This defines the entire construction of the message. It is not the voice of “international lawyers” in the sense of neutral expertise, but rather an instrument of political representation, elevated to the international level and framed in the language of law and human rights. Only in this context does the actual objective of the communication become clear. It is not about the HRRT itself. It is about redefining it. An instrument designed to support resilience against hybrid threats is recast in the message as a tool of political control. This reinterpretation is then reinforced through the language of legal accountability and embedded in a frame of “double standards,” allowing the dispute to be expanded from a technical issue to a systemic one.
The function of the statement is therefore to establish an interpretive frame in which EU actions in the field of resilience can be consistently presented as interference.
This pattern is not incidental. A previous investigation by the Disinfo Digest Investigations team into the activities of lawyer Gonzalo Boye, including his role as defence counsel for Pablo González, also known as Pavel Rubtsov, and Anatoliy Shariy, demonstrated that a similar mechanism had been applied in cases related to national security, where actions taken by public institutions were reframed as violations of individual rights. In the case analysed here, the same model is applied at a higher level. It is no longer directed at an individual, but at an instrument of EU policy. The difference in scale is significant, but the underlying logic remains the same. Law is not used here solely as a tool of defence, but as a lever for reshaping perception.
Message construction and vectors of influence: the frames introduced by the statement
The Amsterdam & Partners LLP statement reveals the architecture of the operation from its very first lines. The information that the firm acts as legal counsel for the leader of the “Strong Armenia” project, while simultaneously announcing the filing of a complaint with the European Commission in connection with the deployment of HRRT in Armenia, functions as a key piece of metadata. It defines the sender’s interest and frames how the entire message should be read. This is neither expert communication nor neutral legal analysis. It is procedural communication, designed to move beyond the legal arena and enter the wider information environment.
Within a single paragraph, the statement combines and immediately reveals three elements. First, the formalisation of the conflict through reference to procedure (“the filing of a complaint”), which gives the message institutional weight. Second, the attribution of agency to the European Union by directly linking its actions to interference in the political process. Third, the immediate elevation of the stakes by framing the issue in normative terms such as “free and fair elections.” This configuration is not accidental. It creates a classic flashpoint of an information operation, in which the statement does not initiate a discussion but forces a position to be taken.
A central element of the message construction is the way in which the function and financing of the HRRT (Hybrid Rapid Response Team) are presented. The statement refers to funding at the level of €27 million under NDICI–Global Europe and describes the task as “monitoring hybrid threats and public narratives” in the pre-election period. This is the point at which a key interpretive shift occurs. A technical and defensive function is recast as a potential tool for interference in political debate. The mechanism of this manipulation does not rely on false information, but on the way elements are combined. The €27 million figure, which in reality refers to a broader architecture of funding for resilience-building activities in partner countries, is in the statement fused with one specific instrument, the HRRT, and one specific moment, namely the pre-election period in Armenia. As a result, a simplified image is created, in which the reader is left with a straightforward formula: high external funding, monitoring of domestic narratives, and elections in Armenia. Such a construction automatically triggers an association with political interference, even though, in practice, it concerns dispersed funding allocated across different activities, implemented in different countries and over varying time horizons, as well as short-term, technical expert support in the case of Armenia.
This is a classic example of selective aggregation. Elements that function separately, such as programme funding, the scope of the instrument, and the electoral context, are combined into a single narrative construct that alters their meaning. As a result, the audience no longer analyses the details but reacts to a ready-made conclusion that the EU is financing a mechanism for monitoring political debate during elections. The next step follows directly from this operation. A mechanism described as supporting resilience is embedded in the logic of “securitisation” (framing an issue as a matter of security) of legitimate political activity. Within such a narrative, the actions of public authorities can be portrayed as targeting the opposition, for example by labelling its activities as “foreign interference”. As a consequence, the discussion shifts away from security and moves into the realm of political rights and freedoms. This is not a description of the HRRT’s function, but a reinterpretation serving a specific purpose.
From an operational perspective, the set of concepts used is particularly significant. They do not function solely as elements of argumentation, but as ready-made carriers of transmission. “Monitoring narratives” can easily be reduced to “control of messaging.” “The legal accountability of the Commission” simplifies into an “institutional scandal.” “Double standards,” in turn, provide a ready bridge to existing narrative ecosystems in which undermining the credibility of the West is already an established pattern. In this sense, the statement does not merely describe reality, but prepares its interpretation for further distribution.
The operational sequence of the statement: how the frame of interference is constructed
The statement under analysis does not develop its argument in a linear manner. Its structure more closely resembles a sequence of successive shifts that gradually alter the meaning of the entire issue. The first step is to raise the stakes of the dispute. Instead of referring to the parameters and scope of the HRRT, the statement immediately employs language that triggers a precautionary response within Western institutions: “legal liability,” “misuse of powers,” “acting beyond competence,” and “violations of fundamental rights.” This shifts the discussion from a technical level to one of legal and reputational risk. From that point onward, the question is no longer whether the instrument is appropriate, but whether its use can be challenged as unlawful.
The next element is a reversal of the security logic. In the official framing of the European Union, the HRRT is intended to respond to hybrid threats, including information operations targeting democratic processes. In the statement, this direction is inverted. The threats themselves are no longer presented as the problem; the response to them is. Within this narrative, protective measures are recast as potential tools of political pressure. As a result, the actor meant to strengthen resilience is redefined as a source of risk, and the very idea of countering interference begins to be interpreted as a form of interference.
The third step is the introduction of moral asymmetry. The statement refers to examples of countries such as Russia and Georgia, suggesting that the European Union applies different standards to them than it does to its own actions in Armenia. This is not about establishing full symmetry in comparison. It is sufficient to suggest an analogy in order to undermine the EU’s normative credibility and activate one of the most resonant narrative shortcuts, namely the accusation of “double standards.”
The final stage is the escalation of the entire issue to a systemic level. The statement does not limit itself to identifying potential concerns related to the HRRT. It advances the claim that the European Commission is crossing the line between support and interference. This is a critical shift. If such a frame is accepted, any subsequent action in the field of information resilience can be interpreted in the same way, regardless of its actual nature.
The overall effect is further reinforced by another technique that is critical to the effectiveness of the message. Within a single sequence, elements of different status are brought together, including real risks that accompany any policy in the field of information security, such as asymmetry between government and opposition or limited transparency of mandates, alongside claims that require verification, such as specific funding parameters or the scope of the HRRT’s functions. As a result, credible elements reinforce contested ones, and the audience ceases to distinguish between them.
Verification of the statement against source documents
A comparison of the Amsterdam & Partners LLP statement with documents of EU institutions and other source materials reveals a clear discrepancy between the description provided and the actual scope of the HRRT’s activities.
The mandate of this instrument in EU documents is relatively precise. The Council of the European Union states that HRRTs are to provide “tailored and targeted short-term assistance” and are to be deployed “upon request.” This indicates a tool of an interventionist and time-limited nature, activated in response to a specific need rather than a permanent mechanism operating within the information space. A similar logic is confirmed by the European Commission, which describes the HRRT as a form of expert support, coordinated inter alia by the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, aimed at responding to hybrid threats. In this framing, there is no reference to “monitoring public debate” as a function of the instrument itself, but rather to supporting response capacities in crisis situations, including in the field of information threats.
The most concrete picture is provided by a journalistic report published by the Armenian service of Azatutyun, operating within Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. It indicates that the planned deployment of the HRRT in Armenia involves a team of 9 to 14 experts, assigned for approximately 10 to 15 working days. Their role is to provide advisory support to state institutions, including the Prime Minister’s Office and the Security Council, in the areas of crisis management, cybersecurity, and countering FIMI. The beneficiaries are also said to include administrative bodies such as the electoral commission and the Ministry of the Interior. This describes activities of a capacity-building nature and procedural support, rather than operational monitoring of political content.
The most problematic element of the statement concerns funding. The indicated amount of €27 million is presented as directly linked to the HRRT, suggesting the existence of a single, distinct budget assigned to this instrument. However, an analysis of available information points to a different structure. In the public domain, various levels of funding appear in parallel, including multi-year support packages for Armenia, funds dedicated to electoral processes, and regional programmes aimed at countering information manipulation within the Eastern Partnership. Against this background, the €27 million figure appears to be an aggregate of different funding streams, which in the statement is attributed to a single instrument. This does not necessarily imply falsehood in a formal sense, but it alters the meaning of the information. Dispersed resources, allocated across different activities and timeframes, are condensed into a single reference point that functions as an argument reinforcing the claim about the scale of interference. A similar effect can be observed in the reference to the NDICI–Global Europe instrument. This is a broad mechanism for financing the European Union’s external actions, encompassing various components, including geographic, thematic, and rapid response elements. Its presence in the context of the HRRT is therefore natural, as the instrument includes components designed to provide swift support to partners. However, this does not automatically mean that a specific HRRT deployment has a separate, unified budget directly assigned to it.
Equally important is the way the criteria for identifying information manipulation are presented. The statement suggests that such assessments are arbitrary. However, the approach of the European External Action Service defines Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference as a set of intentional and coordinated activities, analysed through patterns of behaviour and techniques rather than through the evaluation of individual political statements. This means that the focus lies on identifying patterns of conduct, not on adjudicating political disputes.
Finally, the broader informational context is also significant. The narrative of “EU interference in elections in Armenia” was already present in the information environment before the publication of the statement under analysis. It had previously been identified and described, among others, by EUvsDisinfo as part of a broader narrative pattern circulating in pro-Kremlin environments. This means that the law firm’s statement does not create a new interpretation from scratch, but rather fits into an already existing frame and reinforces its credibility through the use of legal language and formal procedures.
Actors and the logic of interests
In this case, three layers of activity overlap. There are actors who construct the message, actors who benefit from it politically, and the environment that allows the message to take on a life of its own.
On the operational side stands the law firm and its principal public-facing representative, Robert Amsterdam. The wording of the statement is not accidental. It draws on the language of principles and standards, while at the same time directing attention to the European Commission as an actor expected to justify its actions. Particular significance is attached to the phrase describing a shift “from supporter to participant.” It is constructed to function beyond the document itself and to be easily reproduced in media coverage and commentary. The political beneficiary of these dynamics is Samvel Karapetyan and his Strong Armenia project. Karapetyan is a figure with a distinctly oligarchic profile, with a business background closely tied to the Russian market. Available information points to his long-term presence in Russia, Russian citizenship, and control over the Tashir Holding group. In a context where Armenia is deepening its cooperation with the European Union, such a profile is not neutral and contributes to political polarisation.
Domestic decisions also play a significant role, as they can be interpreted as evidence of unequal treatment of political actors. Amendments to the electoral code, which prohibit the use of personal names in coalition titles, directly affected the environment associated with Karapetyan. In practice, this required a change to the name of his political project. Regardless of the formal justifications, such a decision can be framed as a restriction on the opposition, and it functions in this form within the narrative.
The third level is the information environment, which allows such interpretations to take hold and persist. It consists of pre-existing narratives about EU interference in elections, references to the situation in Moldova, and a broader regional sensitivity to issues of external influence. In this context, earlier statements by EU representatives gain relevance, as they can be used to reinforce already established claims. As a result, the dispute unfolds across several layers. On one level, there is the actual political dynamic within Armenia, with its internal tensions and conflicts. On another, there is a struggle over how the actions of the European Union are to be interpreted, whether as support for resilience or as foreign interference. It is precisely this second layer that the law firm’s statement seeks to shape by imposing a particular understanding of the entire situation.
Law as a vector of influence. A recurring mechanism in a new context
Legal instruments, combined with the sensitivity of EU institutions to standards, fundamental rights, and procedures, become a particularly susceptible area of influence in such situations. This is not a random choice, but a space in which responses are inherently cautious and every decision must be justified in the language of principles. For actors operating at the intersection of law and communication, this creates an opportunity to pursue actions that formally remain within the system, while simultaneously shaping how that system is interpreted. This mechanism was already visible in the previously analysed model associated with Gonzalo Boye, where legal proceedings served a dual function. On the one hand, they provided defence for specific individuals; on the other, they became a tool for influencing how those cases were understood in the public sphere. What proved crucial was the combination of legal pressure with a reversal of the narrative vector. The accused ceased to be perceived as a security risk and instead began to function as a victim of state actions. In this configuration, not only the outcomes of proceedings mattered, but also their course, their cost, their duration, and their capacity to generate ambiguity and to shift the dispute beyond the courtroom.
In the case of Amsterdam & Partners, the point of departure is different, but the underlying logic remains similar. The focus is no longer on individual cases, but on challenging an instrument of EU policy. The mechanism, however, follows a comparable pattern. It begins with the formalisation of the dispute and the elevation of its significance. This is followed by a reversal of roles, in which an institution operating in the field of resilience is portrayed as a violator of principles. The next step is the internationalisation of the message and the creation of reputational pressure.
In the model observed earlier, there was also a component of reinforcing the message through external legitimisation, for example in the form of voices from legal communities defending the autonomy of the profession. Such a component acts as a buffer, because criticism of a specific action can be framed as an attack on the very principle of the right to defence. In the case of Armenia, a similar logic is transferred to the institutional level. Criticism of a support instrument is meant to be interpreted as criticism of democratic standards. From the perspective of information operations, this is a particularly effective model. It operates within areas that are fundamental to liberal institutions. Law, procedures, and fundamental rights are not treated here as constraints, but as resources that can be transformed into tools for shaping perception and political decision-making.
Framing instead of facts. Implications for monitoring and communication
In practice, this model primarily affects how facts are interpreted. The dispute is no longer about the information itself, but about the frame through which it is understood. If the simplified claim that HRRT “monitors narratives and interferes in elections” becomes entrenched in the information environment, subsequent data, even when well-documented, will be received within a context already shaped by suspicion.
The most likely pathway for the spread of this message stems from the fact that, within pro-Kremlin environments, the narrative of EU interference in elections was already present and has repeatedly been described as manipulative. New content therefore does not need to build the narrative from scratch. It is sufficient to provide a current quote and an updated context that can be fitted into an existing storyline. A second channel consists of diaspora and regional media. The argument of double standards tends to resonate well there, particularly during election periods, when every decision by public institutions becomes part of political contestation. A third layer is the global space, where the notion of Western hypocrisy serves as a common denominator across very different audiences. In such a context, references to fundamental rights and the legal accountability of institutions can easily gain traction.
A response to such messaging does not lie in simple denial. A more effective approach is to close the interpretive space by presenting facts clearly and consistently. The mandate of the HRRT, as set out in documents of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission, is unambiguous. It is a short-term instrument, deployed upon request and designed to provide targeted support. What matters is that this description is communicated in a form that is easily quotable and resistant to being taken out of context. In the case of Armenia, concrete data on the scale of the operation, such as the number of experts and the duration of the mission, are particularly useful. Such information effectively challenges the image of an extensive monitoring system, while avoiding engagement in an ideological dispute.
Equally important is how FIMI is communicated. In the documents of the European External Action Service, it is described as the analysis of recurring patterns of behaviour, rather than the evaluation of individual views. This distinction has practical significance, as it limits the possibility of portraying such actions as a form of censorship. If this level is maintained, the message loses its traction. If it is not, it begins to function exactly as intended.
Author: Wojciech Pokora